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In Living Alterities, Emily Lee has assembled an engaging 
and stimulating collection of essays written by leading 
philosophers of race working within, or at least sympathetic 
to, the phenomenological tradition. The particular thematic 
focus, as the subtitle makes clear, is on the significance 
of embodiment for our theorization of race and racism. 
As Lee points out in her introduction, there is a tendency 
to understand race as all in the mind in philosophical 
discussions of the topic—the body is there at best only 
passively, as that upon which race is imposed by misguided 
or malicious minds. Lee turns to phenomenology here 
precisely because it is a tradition characterized by its 
approach to and emphasis on embodiment. The essays 
overall thus take seriously the way in which subjectivity 
is always embodied in such a way that consciousness is 
shaped constitutively by that embodiment. In the case 
of a deeply racialized world, this means that race is not 
simply a product of consciousness but is importantly prior
to consciousness. As Lee puts the point, the aim of the 
volume is to theorize “how the meanings circumscribing 
embodiment construct the experiences the subject 
encounters and consequently how the subject develops 
certain emotions, knowledge, ethical/moral postures, and 
sense of being-in-the-world” (7). This means that race 
“does not lie as a superficial cover over the primary later 
of common humanity” (7), and suggests that it is important 
to explore the possibility of “positive, identity-affirming 
reasons to recognize distinguishable bodily differences” 
(6). The eleven essays in this volume work together to 
explore this general theme, and the volume overall offers 
an important and refreshing intervention into the ongoing 
philosophical theorization of race and racism. 
Charles Mills offers the first contribution to this collection 
of essays with his “Materializing Race.” Mills has never 
worked, nor claimed to work, in the phenomenological 
tradition, and this essay is no exception. Nevertheless, 
his text sets the stage nicely for what is to come and 
provides a kind of “soft landing,” so to speak, for readers 
interested in race and embodiment but less familiar with 
phenomenology. Beginning from the Marxist appeal to 
class as a sociopolitical material, Mills raises the question 
of whether race can be understood to have a similar 
materiality. Drawing from feminist efforts to draw upon 
relations of reproduction as the material basis for gender, 
Mills argues that “from the modern period onward (when 
race comes into existence), race is indeed material in that 
it is because of race that one is entitled to or debarred 
from the ‘normal’ treatment extended to white humans” 
(34). While class and gender, unlike race, have a basis in 
our fundamental need for production and reproduction to 
survive that give them a strong mind-independence, race is 
nevertheless independent of our will insofar as once racial 
categories have been created, they take on a life of their 
own that forms an inescapable material basis for human 
praxis within that racialized context characterized by the 
normalization of the white body. Mills’s essay ultimately 
both serves as an accessible and well-argued introduction 
to the theme of this volume, as well as building upon and 
elaborating themes from his own significant body of work 
in the philosophy of race. 
In contrast to Mills, George Yancy’s work has always been 
deeply informed by the phenomenological tradition 
(especially the work of Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, and 
Fanon), and has thus been squarely focused on issues of 
embodiment with regard to race. Yancy’s contribution to 
this volume is primarily a summary and recapitulation of 
some of the major themes from his prior work, including 
his emphasis on the ways in which racialized bodies are 
constituted as such through the intentional acts (gazes) of 
agents whose own agency is itself conditioned by their 
own racialized bodies. Within a racist social context (an 
anti-black world), this means that white bodies and thus 
white perspectives are normalized, valorized, and affirmed, 
while non-white bodies and perspectives are pathologized, 
marginalized, and denigrated. Yancy revisits vignettes 
familiar to those who have studied his work, including his 
examples of the elevator ride and the click of car doors 
locking, and creates what is a succinct and rich survey 
of this prior work. While this is valuable, he concludes 
the chapter by offering a new, though brief, discussion 
of crisis in relation to racialized embodiment, especially 
as it pertains to whiteness. If racism aims to normalize
racist hierarchies and white-supremacist modes of being 
(embodiment), then perhaps one aspect of resistance to 
this process is to generate conditions of discomfort and 
crisis. “For the most part,” Yancy points out, “white people 
are not in crisis vis-à-vis their whiteness; they are under 
constant therapeutic reprieve, assured that there is nothing 
problematic about whiteness, about their white selves” (62). 
As a consequence, crises of discomfort that problematize 
whiteness can be viewed as a positive prescription for anti-
racism. Yancy’s essay is a valuable introduction to his work 
for those who are not already familiar with it, as well as 
presenting a new development of his thought for those 
who have experience with his prior work. 
Donna-Dale Marcano turns to a meta-philosophical reflection 
on the place (or lack thereof) of black women within the 
discipline (both as an institution/profession and as a body 
of thought) in the third chapter. Drawing from feminist 
philosophy’s argument for the male-ness of philosophy, 
Marcano builds an intersectional analysis that makes a 
clear case for ongoing systematic erasure of black women 
from the discipline. As she puts the point, “I contend that 
the interlocking and multiple oppressions faced by Black 
women in American history acts to inhibit the inclusion of 
their intellectual work as philosophical and philosophically 
relevant because they are Black and women” (68). While 
making a very compelling case for this claim, Marcano is 
careful to argue that the appropriate response is not simply 
to ignore race and gender in our philosophical practices, 
as if blackness and femaleness were simply superficial 
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coverings of an essentially genderless and raceless 
philosopher. Rather, she urges a deep diversification of the 
discipline that should be manifest not only in terms of the 
texts we cite and teach in our courses but also in terms 
of the actual bodies that constitute our ranks. Marcano’s 
contribution is ideal for use in philosophy courses, offering 
as it does a brief but compelling summary of the state of 
the discipline and argument for radical intervention. 
The fourth essay in this volume, Namita Goswami’s “Among 
Family Women,” returns to the debates within postcolonial 
feminism surrounding Sati, but with an important and 
innovative discussion of the relation between culture and 
the body. Goswami begins with the claim, common within 
postcolonial feminist discourses but all too uncommon 
outside of them, that there is a pronounced “‘first world’ 
privilege” in much feminist theory, such that “‘Western’ 
women emerge as the true subjects of feminism while 
‘third world’ women are relegated to perpetual object-
status” (80). The people of the so-called third world thus 
remain cast in the role of nature to Western culture. From 
this relatively familiar starting point, Goswami notes that 
there is a deep irony operating here that connects in an 
interesting way with embodiment. The way in which so-
called third-world women are relegated to the role of 
object/nature is in part through the exercise of certain 
cultural practices and traditions (such as sati) that become 
overdetermined as barbaric. At the same time, the nature/ 
culture divide rests on an emphasis on the human body 
as the organic embodiment of our “exceptionalism” vis-
à-vis the natural world. Thus, some cultural practices 
are disassociated from the “natural” world and properly 
human, while others are understood as inextricably bound 
up with and expressions of the natural world, and Goswami 
draws two important implications from this. First, one way 
in which these different cultural practices are distinguished 
is not through the content of the practices themselves 
but rather through the kinds of bodies that undertake 
them, and second, this underlying irony of an embodied 
disassociation from the natural points to the need to 
radically critique the very distinction between the natural 
and the cultural that underlies so much of the (post)colonial 
relation. Goswami’s essay offers a compelling exploration 
of these implications. 
David Kim’s contribution is a thoughtful and challenging 
exploration of specificity of Asian American relations to 
whiteness. Arguing first that the common “model minority” 
and assimilationist tropes “conceal and mystify” and 
ongoing subordination of Asian Americans, Kim focuses 
on the way in which this subordination shapes the agency 
of Asian Americans, especially insofar as it generates 
shame and other emotions connected with negative self-
evaluation. It is this focus on emotions that brings Kim 
to the topic of embodiment, for he stresses the idea that 
“emotion is a feeling through the body to what matters in 
the world,” and as such, they “are world-constituting in 
addition to being world-disclosing” (115). Drawing from 
empirical studies that focus in particular on Asian American 
identification with whiteness and efforts to affirm distance 
from those “fresh off the boat,” Kim’s essay is not only 
an important analysis racialized embodiment in the U.S. 
context but an implicit argument for the importance of 
attending to the specificities of particular racialized groups 
(and bodies) as opposed to the one-size-fits-all tradition of 
the black/white binary. 
Drawing on the phenomenological work of Merleau-Ponty 
and Bergson (among others), Alia Al-Saji offers an account 
of what she refers to as the “intransigent and closed 
logic” of racializing vision and the ways and means of its 
interruption (133). If vision is not a mere passive reception 
of the visible but rather involves “constitutive operations” 
that differentially render visible and invisible (and 
emphasize or marginalize) according to a complex network 
of sedimentation habituation (138), and racialization is 
a crucial aspect of that habitual network, then racialized 
perception “circumscribes and configures what is seen, 
so that the realm of visual objectivity is narrower than the 
historicity and social structure on which it relies” (139). 
Because these modes of seeing (and not-seeing) are 
a matter of embodied habits, they have an importantly 
affective dimension to such an extent that “affect and 
perception form two sides of the same phenomenon, 
linking that which is seen as racialized to its immediately 
felt effects on the racializing body” (140). Al-Saji’s important 
move here is to draw our attention to the ways in which 
encounters that disrupt racialized visual habits, moments 
characterized by “hesitation,” can be a crucial component 
of efforts to disrupt those habits. She carefully differentiates 
between the all-too-common moments of hesitation on 
the part of the oppressed generated by those racialized 
habits that inhibit agency and action on the one hand, 
and the less common moments of “responsive hesitation” 
that “[loosen] the net of internalized determinism and 
stereotype” (154). She persuasively argues that sustained 
generation of such moments of hesitation is an important 
(and perhaps necessary) aspect of any successful effort to 
disrupt racialized perception (and thus racism). 
Mariana Ortega takes up the work of María Lugones to 
explore the phenomenology of “home” in relation to 
ambiguous, even multiplicitous, notions of self in the 
seventh chapter. As an exercise of what she refers to as 
“self-mapping” (173), Ortega begins with the problematic 
relationship to “belonging” engendered by the notion of 
home, especially insofar as the concepts of home and 
belonging are inherently bound up with conditions of 
identity. The phenomenology of home—the experience 
of a place or even an experience as familiar, comfortable, 
and significantly mine, is in large part a matter of 
standing in a real or imagined relation to those who are 
like me in a particular sense, and an exclusion of those 
who are not. Histories of colonialism, exile, oppression, 
sexism, and racism (among others), however, generate 
conditions wherein this experience of home and the self 
is complicated and modified such that it is ambiguous, 
multiplicitous, and even contradictory. Rather than see this 
as inherently problematic, Ortega takes up the challenge 
of abandoning the project of an integrated and unitary 
self (and thus an unambiguous sense of belonging) and 
finding a way to affirm, or at least live with, that ambiguity 
and contradiction. To advance this project, she introduces 
“hometactics,” which are “everyday practices in which we 
literally ‘make do’ with what we have, [and] do not form 
a robust sense of belonging or familiarity” (185). Ortega’s 
FALL 2015  | VOLUME 15  | NUMBER 1 PAGE 25 




essay points provocatively toward an open-ended process 
of constant negotiation and renegotiation of home(s) and 
the relations that constitute belonging. 
The eighth chapter is Edward Casey’s theorization of 
the concepts of borders and boundaries as they relate 
an actual border—that between the United States and 
Mexico (la Frontera). Beginning with a general account of 
edges, Casey quickly focuses in on a contrast between 
boundary and border. While both borders and boundaries 
“act to demarcate a given place or region,” a border “is 
a clearly and crisply delineated entity, and is established 
by conventional agreements such as treaties or laws,” 
while a boundary, in contrast, “is rarely demarcated with 
any precision, varying in contour and extent depending 
on environmental or historical circumstances” (192). 
Furthermore, while boundaries are porous and lacking in 
“exact positioning,” borders are impermeable and exist in 
a precise and exact location. To be clear, the distinction 
is largely heuristic, for Casey (rightly, in my view), does 
not think any actual border exists as he has described it. 
Indeed, borders, he tells us, “are ideal and eidetic” (199), 
brought into (pseudo) existence by human convention, the 
aim of which is first and foremost a distinction between us
on this side, and them beyond the border. Casey observes, 
however, that “borders are always already in the process of 
becoming boundaries” (202), such that every effort to fix 
an impermeable and stable border begins immediately to 
slip beyond our grasp, becoming porous and ambiguous. 
Armed with this set of theoretical developments, Casey turns 
to la Frontera, the border between the United States and 
Mexico. The conclusion of his essay is a careful elucidation 
of the way in which the border as an ideal aims to police 
racialized bodies in a way that preserves a mythologized 
purity on either side, and that the reality of la Frontera as a 
boundary reveals the way in which the racialized bodies on 
both sides act to dispel that myth. 
In her essay, “Pride and Prejudice: Ambiguous Racial, 
Religious, and Ethnic Identities of Jewish Bodies,” Gail 
Weiss takes on the work of Sander Gilman, Jean-Paul 
Sartre, and Frantz Fanon on anti-Semitism and Jewish 
identity. In particular, she offers a critical engagement with 
their claim that Jewish identity is ultimately a matter of the 
ways in which society at large (and anti-Semitic societies 
in particular) perceives and portrays Jewish bodies. Both 
Gilman and Sartre are concerned, in particular, with the 
ways in which Jews internalize anti-Semitic attitudes and 
negative stereotypes, and Weiss is expecially interested 
in the way in which this internalization is embodied into 
what she refers to as the “intercorporeal dimensions of 
Jewish experience” (214). This is an important feature, she 
argues, but to grant the (hostile) other the ability to define 
one’s identity undermines the agency of the oppressed. 
Furthermore, it disavows what Weiss considers the inherent 
ambiguity of identities; ambiguities that “can and should 
be seen as productive possibilities, expanding the range 
of potential ways one can access, engage, and ultimately 
transform Jewish experience” (218). Weiss’s contribution 
is provocative and points toward promising avenues of 
further theoretical development. 
In the penultimate essay, Emily Lee turns to white 
embodiment and, specifically, the question of 
responsibility in relation to the privileges bestowed by 
that white embodiment. Lee begins with Merleau-Ponty’s 
account of the way in which bodily movement “generates 
phenomenological space and time” (233) to help provide 
an account of freedom as a responsibility for the entirety 
of one’s situation, including significantly aspects of one’s 
situation that one may simply have inherited. That is, 
because the body “possesses an immediate intertwining 
with the world” (237) that is conditioned by “motivational 
relations (242)” in which a given subject’s actions are 
bound up within a temporal and physical horizon that 
both conditions and is conditioned by those actions, it 
becomes necessary, if we are to account for freedom and 
responsibility, to become response-able to that situational 
horizon. As Lee puts the point, “All human beings can 
reason, but, from a series of past decisions [not always their 
own past decisions], they develop into subjects who utilize 
their reason in varying complex ways” (244). This means 
that racialized subjectivity, including white subjectivity, is 
an integral part of a given agent’s sense of self for which 
one must take responsibility if one is to realize one’s 
autonomy as an agent. Though she only offers this point 
as a concluding suggestion, Lee makes it clear that such 
“taking responsibility” cannot be a strictly epistemic or 
intellectual undertaking, but must itself be embodied, and 
include “developing and accumulating different and new 
body movements” (248). 
Linda Alcoff’s essay on “The Future of Whiteness” is a 
challenging conclusion to this text with broad implications 
for the phenomenology of race. The framing question 
arises because of the way in which dominant discourses 
on race, both inside and outside of philosophy, tend to 
see whiteness as a kind of ontological lynchpin for racism, 
such that any commitment to antiracism must entail a 
commitment to the elimination of whiteness as such. This 
general line of argument holds that a just future must 
be one in which there is no such thing as the white race. 
Confronting this question at the end of this volume is an 
important moment, for it highlights the way in which the 
usual approach to race and racism cannot be maintained 
within the phenomenological tradition. Phenomenology 
foregrounds embodied consciousness and the reflexive 
interplay between that embodied/historically situated 
subjectivity and the larger social/material world, while 
rejecting an abstract, featureless (liberal) subject. 
Consequently, it must call into question the assumption 
that racialized subjects, including white subjects, must 
shed their racial specificity, and ask whether there are 
“any useful first-person insights that might provide a 
re-visioning of possibilities toward a changed national 
landscape that would include whites as whites” (262). Just 
as Weiss’s essay takes up the way in which Jewish identity 
is not reducible to the view that anti-Semites have of Jews, 
Alcoff is here arguing that white identity is not reducible 
to white supremacy. Whiteness must, she holds, revise 
itself substantially, but this is different from calling for its 
elimination or abolition. Alcoff’s phenomenological project 
here is an important one and an excellent way to conclude 
this volume. 
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The essays assembled in this text comprise a significant 
contribution both to phenomenology and to the 
philosophical study of race and racism. Lee has brought 
together an impressive array of scholars offering a diverse 
set of approaches and topics, but yet they are all clearly 
united under the thematic umbrella of a shared commitment 
to thinking through racialized embodiment. A particular 
strength of this text as an anthology, and of great credit to 
Lee as editor, is the way in which the essays collected here 
not only stand up as individual pieces but hang together so 
very well as a whole. The book should thus be of interest to 
scholars and students of phenomenology and to theorists 
of race and racism sympathetic to phenomenological 
approaches to the topic. It is a timely and important 
collection of scholarship. 
Living Alterities: Phenomenology,
Embodiment, and Race 
Emily S. Lee, ed. (Albany: SUNY Press, 2014). 300 pages. 
$90.00 hardcover, $25.95 paperback. ISBN: 978-1-4384­
5016-2. 
Heather Rakes 
DEPAUL UNIVERSITY, HRAKES@DEPAUL.EDU 
Emily Lee’s edited volume Living Alterities brings 
together important contributions by philosophers of race 
in a text that consistently centers embodiment through 
phenomenological approaches. It will be a significant text 
for scholarship in these fields and as assigned reading for 
undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy across 
continental and analytic approaches. The richness, breadth, 
and depth of the offerings in this anthology constitute a 
rare achievement because they find new ways to make 
old and still necessary critiques, as they also find ways 
to name new and emerging phenomena with regard to 
race, white supremacy, and change. Several of the essays 
in this collection are grappling with the presumed “post 
race” conditions of our current U.S. American moment. 
This problematic context is perhaps best summed up by 
Kimberlé Crenshaw Williams’s rejection of what she called 
the “vulgarized social construction thesis,” which follows 
a logic that since categories such as race and gender are 
constructed, it does not make sense to continue theorizing 
on these categories (Crenshaw, 1296).1 Philosophers of race 
struggle with the realities of race and the material, bodily, 
social, political, economic, and psychological conditions 
it produces, grappling with the dominant culture’s and 
philosophy’s lack of accountability for the ways race is real, 
even if it is not biologically real. The contributors to this 
volume successfully continue these interventions. 
One of the most successful elements of the anthology as
a whole is its organization. Rather than having “parts” with
headings, Lee has organized the book as a kind of unfolding
of key related ideas and themes, as I will try to show. Thus,
in what follows, I will address the volume in its chronological
chapter progression while highlighting important thematic
connections. More specifically, while whiteness and white
supremacy are addressed throughout in various ways,
whiteness studies as a field that centers questions of
whiteness is engaged in the final two chapters of the book;
whiteness comes last. As Lee notes in her Introduction, the
early chapters emphasize the materiality of race and its
embodiment (Mills; Yancy). The chapters that follow take up
phenomenology and phenomenological exercises in varying
ways, but with different emphases such as race, gender,
and postcoloniality (Marcano; Goswami), hesitation (Al-Saji),
assimiliationist demands (Kim), mapping and belonging
(Ortega), ambiguities of race and ethnicity of Jewish bodies
(Weiss), and, finally, individual white responsibility and the
future of whiteness (Lee; Alcoff). 
In chapter one, “Materializing Race,” Charles W. Mills 
rejects a Marxist racial eliminativism, which locates race at 
the superstructural level, as ideological, and not existing 
at the base level of materiality. Engaging Alcoff’s work in 
Visible Identities, he situates gender as having a basis in 
biological reproductive difference, whereas race has no 
such basis. Ultimately, he argues for an understanding of 
a nonbiological, rather sociopolitical, materially originating 
apparatus of race, which is a useful conception. It seems 
indisputable that race is real, material, and bodily, for all 
its social and political constructedness. I appreciate Mills’s 
gesture to socialize materiality. That said, I wonder which 
audiences, who are not otherwise compelled as to the 
realness and constructedness of race, would be convinced 
of these assertions by a revisioning of Marxist materialism. 
My concern is that this form of materialism forces Mills 
into the terrain of deciding what is the base, or the natural, 
thus requiring that even if gender is not natural, sex and its 
biological reproductive determinations are. 
In “White Gazes: What It Feels Like to Be an Essence” 
(chapter two), George Yancy begins by inviting readers 
into his classroom, so to speak, using scenarios with 
predominantly white students to offer the kinds of 
practices that put whiteness in crisis. A central assertion 
is that whiteness is opaque to itself; white people are 
opaque to themselves, and thus the crisis is offered as a 
moment of decision, a valuable condition for white people 
to have to inhabit and which needs to happen more often. 
This is Yancy’s refusal to allow the bad faith of whiteness 
to continue on unchecked in his classrooms, in elevators, 
and in all other spaces. At the very least, when whiteness 
is put into crisis, the moment of decision is brought to the 
fore: white people in this instance have decisions to make 
about whether to change or remain the same. Of particular 
pedagogical interest, with broader implications for why we 
do philosophy, is Yancy’s term explaining white students’ 
desires for/to do philosophy. Philosophy is often thought 
of as “high-falutin conceptual bullshit,” as “something they 
can learn about without any deeply personal demands 
made on them” (44). Yancy disallows this kind of abstraction 
for the student and for the philosopher. 
Donna-Dale L. Marcano’s “Race/Gender and the 
Philosopher’s Body” (chapter three) follows nicely after 
Yancy’s piece, making a neat and tidy rejection of the 
“supersensibility” of philosophy—its claims to be beyond 
the limitations and specificities of embodiment. Refusing 
philosophy’s claims to transcendence of any kind, she 
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